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ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN TREATING MILITARY
PATIENTS WITH HUMAN
IMMUNODEFICIENCY VIRUS
DISEASES
Edmund G. Howe*
The emergence of human immunodeficiency virus-related illness ("HIV")
over the past decade has engendered several ethical issues in military
medicine. Some problems are similar to those encountered in the civilian
setting and some differ entirely.' This article discusses three of these ethical
dilemmas which are of clinical importance to careproviders treating military
personnel with HIV-related illness.2
* M.D. Columbia; J.D. Rutgers University/Catholic University; Associate Professor of
Psychiatry, Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences, Bethesda, Maryland.
The author would like to extend particular thanks to Drs. Harry C. Holloway, Colonel, MC,
USA and Robert J. Ursano, Colonel, USAF, MC for their helpful comments concerning this
paper, and Ms. Alice M. Fladung and Ms. Jacqueline C. Mosely for their effort, care and
patience in typing it.
The opinions expressed herein are those of the author exclusively. They do not represent in
any way the views of the F. Edward Hebert Uniformed Services University of the Health
Sciences or the Department of Defense.
The International Committee on the Taxonomy of Viruses has proposed the name "human
immunodeficiency virus" ("HIV") for the retrovirus that causes AIDS in place of the names
human T-cell lymphotropic virus, type III ("HTLV-III"), and lymphodenopathy-associated
virus ("LAV"), which were used initially.
1. There is considerable controversy surrounding the issue of whether or not a military
physician's obligations to his patient are significantly different from those of his civilian counterpart. See, e.g., Howe, Ethical Issues Regarding Mixed Agency of Military Physicians, 23
SOC. ScI. & MED. 803 (1986) [hereinafter Ethical Issues]; Howe, Medical Ethics-Are They
Different for the Military Physician?, 146 MIL. MED. 837 (1981).
2. An ethical concern particularly relevant to this topic is whether or not the military's
screening of recruits and active duty personnel is justified. Among the justifications offered are
that military recruits, relative to the general population, potentially face higher risks of being
ill if infected by HIV because they receive live virus vaccines to which they may become victim, they receive multiple vaccines which may not be fully effective, and they may be sent to
areas overseas in which they are at risk of acquiring diseases uncommon in this country. Military personnel might, in addition, be called upon during combat to give blood; if infected, they
might transmit the virus.
Some have questioned these rationales, however, alleging that the service's underlying intent
is to detect and eliminate homosexuals from the military. Arguments have been offered, for
example, in response to the transfusion rationale that servicepersons testing positive could be
kept out of combat. See, e.g., Comment, Protecting the PublicFrom AIDS: A New Challenge to
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The first dilemma discussed in this article involves difficulties associated
with a patient's reluctance to discuss his homosexuality with military
careproviders.3 The military's former policies regarding homosexual activity
may have contributed substantially to this reluctance. Homosexuality is illegal in the military under the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ"),
and although a policy adopted in 1985 essentially eliminated criminal sanctions against homosexual patients with HIV, such patients who disclosed
their homosexuality could still be administratively discharged.4 Regardless
of the degree, if any, that this reluctance has impaired military caregivers'
capacity to meet optimally these patients' needs, it is of clinical concern.
On October 14, 1986, Congress enacted a law which forbids the military
from discharging or taking other actions "adverse" to the interests of military patients with HIV who acknowledge their homosexuality. 5 This law
TraditionalForms of Epidemic Control, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 191, 198 n.48
(1986).
The force of this allegation, however, in the opinion of some, is limited due to the fact that
persons affected by HIV include several high-risk groups, including heterosexuals who are
extremely sexually active.
3. A somewhat analagous issue not discussed in this article involves servicepersons who
acquired HIV-related illness through the illegal use of drugs.
4. Homosexual acts between consenting adults are illegal under the Uniform Code of
Military Justice ("UCMJ"). Historically, exclusion of homosexuals from the military in this
country has been based on two rationales: homosexuals are a risk to security and they disrupt
troop morale. See McCrary, The Homosexual Person in the Military and in National Security
Employment, 5 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 115, 116 (1979).
The first allegation has been eroded by court decisions which have held that a nexus is not
inevitable. It has been suggested that defense attorneys should have clients attract public attention to establish that their clients don't fear disclosure of their sexual behavior. See Gayer
v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740 (D.C. Cir. 1973); McCrary, supra at 134-36, 146.
The "disruption to troop morale" assertion remains credible. As the following quotation
reveals, the second rationale continues to receive anecdotal, if not empirical, documentation
and it speaks to homosexuals' as well as non-homosexuals' difficulties:
We did not want to engage in any acts on board ship for fear of getting caught.
Getting caught in our rack together would have been too much to bear for both of us.
But the tension of being together, especially on cruises, and not being able to do what
we wanted was causing too much tension and was nerve wracking.
Doe v. Chaffee, 355 F. Supp. 112, 113 (N.D. Cal. 1973).
For a recent popular account of difficulties, see Shearer, Ship of Shame, Wash. Post, Nov. 9,
1980, § 6 (Parade Magazine), at 22. But see Note, The Constitutionalityof DischargingHomosexual Military Personnel, 12 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 191 (1980-81) (suggesting that the
military's policy of mandatory discharge of homosexuals is unconstitutional).
Servicepersons who report homosexual relations during epidemiological assessment were
granted immunity from criminal sanctions approximately a year ago. Memorandum from The
Secretary of Defense, Policy on Identification, Surveillance and Disposition of Military Personnel Affected with HTLV-III (Oct. 24, 1985) [hereinafter Memorandum]. See also discussion
infra p. 3.
5. National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661, tit. 7,
§ 705(c), 100 Stat. 3904, 3816 (1986) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1102). Section 705(c) of the
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eliminated the sanction which many military patients then feared most from
revealing their homosexuality - administrative discharge. But in eliminating this concern, certain other ethical dilemmas which are more equivocal
and therefore more difficult remain. Values which military careproviders
might prioritize when confronting these problems are suggested.
The second dilemma addressed by this article involves the issue of
whether military physicians' should initiate attempts to maximize their patients' interests, e.g., such as to assist them in appointing surrogate decisionmakers in the event that they become incompetent. Patients with HIV infection in civilian settings may also face difficulties when they wish to appoint
sexual partners as substitute decision-makers, 6 but these difficulties may be
compounded if military patients feel particularly reluctant to discuss their
homosexual relationships. Specific recommendations on how to address this
difficult issue are offered.
The third dilemma discussed in this article involves the conflicts which
medical staff face when patients with HIV-related illness are unwilling to tell
their sexual partners that they have this disease. Military caregivers may
find it easier than their civilian counterparts to protect third parties in these
instances for several reasons, such as their immunity from being sued in an
individual capacity. Nevertheless, it is suggested that military careproviders
Act which deals with restrictions on use of information obtained during certain epidemiologicassessment interviews reads as follows:
(1) Information obtained by the Department of Defense during or as a result of
an epidemiologic-assessment interview with a serum-positive member of the Armed
Forces may not be used to support any adverse personnel action against the member.
(2) For purposes of paragraph (1):
(A) The term epidemiologic-assessment interview means questioning of a serum-positive member of the Armed Forces for purposes of medical treatment or
counseling or for epidemiologic or statistical purposes.
(B) The term serum-positive member of the Armed Forces means a member
of the Armed Forces who has been identified as having been exposed to a virus associated with the acquired immune deficiency syndrome.
(C) The term adverse personnel action includes(i) a court martial;
(ii) non-judicial punishment;
(iii) involuntary separation (other than for medical reasons);
(iv) administrative or punitive reduction in grade;
(v) denial of promotion;
(vi) an unfavorable entry in a personnel record;
(vii) a bar to reenlistment; and
(viii) any other action considered by the Secretary concerned to be an
adverse personnel action.
It can be anticipated that this law will spur court action to expand the kinds of situations in
which servicepersons could be exempted from other provisions in the UCMJ.
6. Steinbrook, Special Report/Preferencesof Homosexual Men with AIDS for Life Sustaining Treatment, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 457 (1986).
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should generally refrain from attempting to protect potential victims, at least
until there is clear legal precedent granting their civilian counterparts the
authority to disclose communications made by their patients. Otherwise,
military physicians risk acting primarily on the basis of power, with neither
social consensus or ethical justification supporting their actions.
I.

DIFFICULTIES ASSOCIATED WITH INTERVIEWING PATIENTS WHO
HAVE ENGAGED IN PRIOR HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT

The dilemma which, until this year, could arise when military physicians
treated servicepersons with HIV-related illness is exemplified by a relatively
recent incident involving three Navy personnel who disclosed their prior homosexual conduct to attending physicians during a medical history review.
These patients apparently believed that their disclosures would remain confidential. Instead, the attending physicians reported the patients' disclosures
to military command; an action which ultimately culminated in administrative proceedings against the naval personnel. The patients felt "betrayed"
and brought suit.7
The potential criminal sanctions to which military patients with HIV-related illness who disclosed their prior homosexual conduct during an epidemiological assessment were potentially vulnerable were reduced when the
Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, issued a memorandum on October
24, 1985, which granted these patients immunity from criminal prosecution
under the UCMJ.8 This policy change was not intended, however, to provide servicepersons who had HIV-related illness and who disclosed homosexual behavior complete protection. 9 Such disclosures, following the 1985
policy change, could still be used in criminal proceedings if other evidence of
homosexuality was obtained from independent sources. Furthermore, such
disclosures could be used as a basis for administrative discharge. As Peter
Wyro, the Pentagon spokesperson for this program stated: "[The Department of Defense ("DOD") memorandum was merely] an effort to balance
out the fact that we want the information with a policy that prohibits homo7. Smith, Navy Forces Out Victims Who Admit Homosexual Contact, Navy Times, Aug.
26, 1985, at 4.
8. Memorandum, supra note 4.
9. A case in which the "independence" of a serviceperson's homosexual behavior was
raised is that of a Navy enlisted man who, after testing positive for HIV infection was later
charged with violating "safe sex" orders when having sexual contact with another man in a
parked car. The Navy judge dismissed the "AIDS-related" charges because they violated the
Navy's own regulation against using the results of HIV screening for criminal purposes.
Moore, AIDS Screening in Military Raises Legal Questions, Wash. Post, Oct. 27, 1986, at Al,
col. 4.

1987]

HIV Testing in the Military

sexuality and non-medical drug use."" °
In practice, each branch of the armed services has responded differently
when military patients with HIV-related illness divulged their homosexuality. The Army's policy was to obtain epidemiological data on the source of
these soldiers' illnesses, and then follow the course of these illnesses while
the soldiers remained on active duty; no administrative proceeding, however,
would be initiated.'" In the Air Force and Navy, on the other hand, it was
the general practice to initiate administrative discharge hearings whenever a
patient's homosexual activity was reported.12 Patients in the Air Force and
Navy, accordingly, were more reluctant to reveal their homosexual conduct
13
to their careproviders than their counterparts in the Army.
The degree to which DOD policy has affected the reluctance of HIV patients to reveal their homosexuality is, however, uncertain. This is due to the
fact that such reluctance might also result from the illegality and social
stigma associated with homosexual behavior in the military, or from the reluctance of caregivers' to initiate discussion of this subject with their patients. Unpublished data obtained by the Air Force, prior to the release of
the October 24, 1985, memorandum-obtained from a study of Air Force
personnel with AIDS informed they had legal immunity-suggests that the
10. Norman, Military AIDS Testing Offers Research Bonus, 232 SCIENCE 818 (1986).

11. Army physicians theoretically were required to report these soldiers' homosexual behavior to their commanders who in turn had a responsibility to decide what action should then
be taken. Some Army persons were discharged, but in most instances, no discharges occurred
because Army physicians neglected to report these persons' homosexual activity to command.

Telephone interview with Ernest T. Takafuji, Colonel, MC, USA, Disease Control Consultant,
Preventive Military Medicine Consultant Division, Office of the Army Surgeon General (Oct.
27, 1986).
12. Telephone interview with Alfred Cheng, Colonel, USAF, MC, Chief, Preventive
Medicine, Office of the Air Force Surgeon General (June 24, 1986) [hereinafter Cheng Inter-

view]; Telephone interview with Michael Stek, Captain, MC, USN, Head of Preventive
Medicine, Bethesda, (MEDCOM-241), Office of the Commander, Naval Medical Command
(Oct. 28, 1986).
13. Howard DeNike, a San Francisco lawyer who specializes in military law, states: "You
cannot expect people to be candid about their condition." Moore, supra note 9, at A4.
The reluctance of servicepersons to acknowledge homosexual relations has led some to question the veracity of epidemiological findings regarding military personnel. Redfield found that
the likely source of infection in 15 of 41 AIDS patients at Walter Reed Army Hospital resulted

from heterosexual, not homosexual contact. Redfield, Heterosexually Acquired HTL V-111
LAV Disease (AIDS-related complex and AIDS)/Epidemiologic Evidence of Female to Male
Transmission, 254 J. A.M.A. 2094 (1985). These results were "viewed with a great deal of

skepticism," however, because they conflicted significantly with reported civilian rates. Norman, supra note 10, at 820. The Army's findings showing a higher percentage of heterosexually tramsmitted AIDS cases, were also claimed by some persons to be an attempt to "cover
up" the Army's underlying intent to exclude homosexual men from the service. Others believed, in turn, that since many of the servicepersons providing Redfield's data were women,
the factual basis for this claim was, at the very least, limited.
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effect of administrative sanctions was in fact substantial.14 Of approximately
twenty servicepersons with AIDS surveyed, the proportion who reported
prior homosexual conduct was comparable to civilian findings. 15 Anecdotally, some Air Force physicians have indicated that patients with less severe
HIV-related illness also discussed homosexuality more freely at that time.
Still, the fact that the survey sample was more willing to discuss their homosexuality may have been due to other factors; including a greater ignorance
on their part as to the gravity of their illness, than a comparable group
would show today.
The degree to which this reluctance, whatever its cause, has actually impaired servicepersons' care is questionable. Civilian patients who have had
the opportunity to discuss homosexual concerns with careproviders have reportedly found it beneficial.16 For example, patients experiencing guilt
about transmitting this illness to their sexual partners, 17 or engaging in a
homosexual lifestyle,1 8 have reportedly reduced their feelings of guilt following discussion with careproviders. 9 Additionally, it is reported that discussions with careproviders may assist homosexual patients in dealing with
their reported "internalization" of society's negative image of homosexuals,2" a condition which is often exacerbated when the homosexual acquires
HIV related illness.2 1
Military patients' relationships with sexual partners may be disrupted by
several factors: 2 2 hospital procedures to control infection may socially iso14. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
15. Cheng Interview, supra note 12.
16. Christ & Wiener, Psychosocial Issues in AIDS, in AIDS: ETIOLOGY, DIAGNOSIS,
TREATMENT AND PREVENTION (V. Devita, S. Heilman & S. Rosenberg eds. 1985); Furstenbergh, Social Work and AIDS, 9 Soc. WORK HEALTH CARE 45, 60 (1984); Wolcott,
Faway & Pasnau, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, 7 GEN. Hosp. PSYCHIATRY 280
(1985) [hereinafter Wolcott & Faway].
"[T]he therapist should be willing to focus initially on the patient's physical symptoms
rather than prematurely deflecting the patient from the somatic to the psychological." Perry
& Markowitz, PsychiatricInterventionsfor AIDS-Spectrum Disorders, 37 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1001, 1003 (1986).
17. Christ & Wiener, supra note 16, at 278; Wolcott & Faway, supra note 16, at 285.
18. Furstenbergh, supra note 16, at 50.
19. Workers Help AIDS Victims Handle Stress, Guilt, NASW News, May 1983, at 3, col.
1 [hereinafter Workers].
20. Furstenbergh, supra note 16, at 50. See also Forstein, The Psychosocial Impact of the
Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 11 SEMIN. ONCOLOGY 77 (1984).
21. Furstenbergh, supra note 16, at 50. See also Morin, Charles & Malyon, The
Psychosocial Impact of AIDS in Gay Men, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1288 (1984) [hereinafter
Morin & Charles].
22. Hausmann, Treating Victims of AIDS Poses Challenge to Psychiatrists, Psychiatric
News, Aug. 5, 1983, at 1, 8; Morin & Batchelor, Responding to the Psychological Crisis of
AIDS, 99 PuB. HEALTH REP. 4, 6 (1984).

HIV Testing in the Military

1987]

late the patient;2" staff may deny a patient's partner visiting privileges that a
spouse would have;24 and the patient's partner may feel distraught about the
patient's illness,25 guilty about transmitting this illness to the patient 26 and
concerned about his own health and thus, decline to visit. 27 Some careproviders, accordingly, advocate treating all those who care about the patient in
addition to treating the patient.2"
Staff in all three services to whom this writer has spoken have markedly
different opinions regarding whether patients' reluctance to discuss their
homosexuality affects the care they receive. Some believe that patients' reluctance to discuss homosexual relationships profoundly impairs the
careprovider's ability to provide adequate care. Others, however, believe
that this reluctance interferes little, if at all, since patients are predominantly
concerned with their own illness and have other resources, such as civilian
homosexual support groups, to discuss their concerns.
Yet, even if military patients felt uninhibited to discuss their homosexuality with military staff, the potential benefit to these patients might be limited.
Although civilian careproviders have reported that discussing these patient's
homosexuality provides benefit, they have also stressed the necessity of the
caregiver being able to appreciate the patient's special concerns. 29 If military careproviders lack specific training in how to counsel homosexual patients, they may be less effective than their civilian counterparts who have
30
received such training.
Military careproviders had several options available to them under previ23.
24.
25.
26.

24

Wolcott & Faway, supra note 16, at 285.
Morin & Batchelor, supra note 22, at 8.
Id. at 8; see also Morin & Charles, supra note 21, at 1291.
Wolcott & Faway, supra note 16, at 285; see also Nichols, PsychiatricAspects of AIDS,

PSYCHOSOMATICS

1083 (1983).

27. Morin & Batchelor, supra note 22.
28. Furstenbergh believes, for example, that it is the social worker's role to assist not only
the patient with HIV-related illness but also his family. Furstenbergh also posits that the
definition of family, in this instance, should be expanded to include the patient's homosexual
partners. Furstenbergh, supra note 16, at 55. See also Workers, supra note 19.
29. Christ & Weiner, supra note 16; Furstenbergh, supra note 16; Wolcott & Faway,
supra note 16.
30. Military careproviders who hold negative attitudes toward homosexual persons, like
their civilian counterparts, could also be ineffective in treating these patients and could even do
them harm. O'Connor, Programsin New York, San FranciscoOffer Assistance, Mental Health
Support to AIDS Victims, Psychiatric News, Sept. 6, 1985, at 8, col. 4 (quoting Sandi Feinblum, Assistant Director of the Gay Men's Health Crisis ("GMHC") in New York City).
Perry reports that three forms of countertransference reactions can take place in careproviders: an unwarranted fear of contagion, a posture of omnipotence and premature referral of
patients to a self-help group, such as a support group for homosexuals. Perry & Markowitz,
supra note 16, at 1004.
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ous policies which could have reduced patient's reluctance to disclose their
homosexual behavior. For example, if a caregiver was obtaining data for an
epidemiological study between October 25, 1985, and October 14, 1986, he
could have informed the patient that any information revealed could not be
used against him in criminal proceedings, but could be used in an administrative discharge proceeding, and that if in the Army, discharge was most
unlikely; but in the Air Force or Navy, it was virtually inevitable. If the data
was not used for epidemiological purposes, however, the careprovider could
inform the patient that theoretically he had no legal immunity, but again
could explain the practical meaning this had within the particular branch of
service to which the patient belonged.
Whether the military careprovider had a moral obligation to share this
information with the patient is, however, open to debate. Arguably, the patient was responsible for knowing this information, but, whether he was responsible or not, the patient would likely have acquired such information
from informal sources. In any case, "warning" all patients in this manner
might risk impairing the trust of many. Therefore, since only a small
number of patients would benefit, and many would be harmed, it is contended that caregivers should not adopt a policy of routinely warning all
patients.
The next dilemma which confronted military careproviders is the question
of what should be done if a patient disclosed his homosexual conduct, and
depending on what the physician chose, whether or not he should tell the
patient of his actions prior to the patient's disclosure. A careprovider had
several options available to him: he could directly inform the patient's commander orally or in writing of the disclosure; he could simply write what the
patient tells him verbatim in the patient's chart; he could write what the
patient tells him, but in euphemistic phrases, presumably devoid of meaning,
such as "the patient discussed relationships;"'" or he could keep the information entirely to himself and write nothing at all. This last option has
several variations. Some military physicians, for instance, tell patients to
give them an "official history" which they transcribe in the record and then
tell the patients to share whatever else they wish to share, which will be kept
"off the record."
If the military careprovider chooses to obfuscate information concerning a
31. Some who have worked as investigators in the armed forces report, however, that
physicians' commonly accepted notion - that they can write phrases so vague that they can
communicate to other physicians who can "read into them" their meaning but not risk harming the patient - is illusory. Investigators perceiving the hidden meaning of such ambiguity
can, for example, confront servicepersons with it and attempt to induce them to acknowledge
prior homosexual behavior.
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patient's prior homosexual conduct, or keeps it entirely to himself, he may
feel personally at risk for not reporting this information to command or for
his failure to record it, particularly if this information contradicts previously
obtained epidemiological data.3 2 Military careproviders may also feel guilty
when they withhold information for non-utilitarian reasons; they may be violating explicit legal obligations owed to the military, and may be violating
implicit moral obligations owed to other soldiers and society.
Caregivers may also fear personal repercussions, a factor which varies according to the branch of service. The Navy, reportedly, places great importance on careproviders' reporting patients' illegal behavior, as is reflected in
its strongly worded regulations. In practice, however, no careprovider in the
services, to this writer's knowledge, has ever been disciplined for not reporting a patient's illegal behavior.
The military's failure to sanction a military physician for his failure to
report homosexual behavior, is, as alluded to previously, probably intentional. The military's having strict regulations against homosexual conduct,
but being somewhat lax in enforcing them, may maximally further mutually
exclusive but independently important ends.33 Strict regulations against homosexual practices may discourage gay persons from joining the military
and influence those who serve to be discreet. Lax enforcement reflected by
the military's failure to discipline caregivers should encourage servicepersons to seek care from military careproviders when they acquire an illness
through homosexual acts. The DOD memorandum which provided homosexual patients with HIV-related illness immunity from criminal, but not
administrative repercussions, was structured similarly to achieve these seemingly contradictory ends.
The conflicting ethical duties presently encountered by military caregivers
when confronting homosexual patients with HIV-related illness are not
without precedent. Such conflicts existed previously, for example, whenever
staff took sexual histories from servicepersons who engaged in homosexual
activities, or drug histories from patients who used illegal drugs. Military
careproviders' approach to servicepersons with HIV-related illness (even
under the new policies) should, in principle, be the same as in these former
situations. However, because the suffering associated with HIV is greater
than for most other illnesses, and because the potential effects of this epi32. His withholding information may also impair his commander's ability to make prudent choices which, theoretically, could prove dangerous to society. See infra note 149.

The epidemiological information obtained may directly benefit not only this society but
populations throughout the world. See infra note 55 and accompanying text for other examples of national and international implications.
33. Ethical Issues, supra note 1; Howe, supra note 1.
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demic are great, a change in caregivers' approaches may be warranted. How
these particular considerations might alter previously existing value priorities is examined in later portions of this article.
The following discussion will present ethically optimal approaches to the
dilemmas which caregivers have faced until just recently and will examine
their implications on medical practice. First, as in earlier situations in which
HIV was not a factor, careproviders should, it would seem, have taken the
initiative to inform patients of theoretical and actual risks faced by divulging
homosexual conduct. Caregivers should not have considered patients responsible for knowing these risks, nor assumed that patients had learned this
information through informal sources. Why? The careprovider presumably
is in a better position than the patient to know this information and, moreover, the patient is exceptionally vulnerable due to his illness to deny or
distort information according to his emotional needs. To inform patients
accurately, of course, caregivers must have access to updated information
regarding what each service does when a patient's homosexual conduct is
reported to command.
If the careprovider planned to reveal information the patient told him, he
shouid have informed the patient prior to the patient's disclosure. This
could be accomplished in all cases only if caregivers routinely informed each
patient of their policy toward such disclosure at the beginning of every interview. This, as stated previously, might have impaired many patients' trust in
their careproviders and might have caused inordinate harm. It is possible,
however, that if caregivers warn patients their trust may be enhanced.3 4 It
may be that the most careproviders can do for patients when they have
strong conflicting obligations is to inform them that they possess such obligations and indicate to the patient which obligation will be given priority.
34. A somewhat analagous situation exists when psychiatric patients are warned that they
have a right to remain silent. It might be expected that a majority would not speak and would
lose trust in their physicians. This may, however, not be the case. In Wisconsin, for instance,

a state in which psychiatrists must warn patients that they have a right to remain silent, a
study revealed that most patients talked readily in spite of the warning. In fact, 42 out of the
50 patients studied followed this course of action. One patient, in fact, after hearing his rights,
"seemed reassured" and became more communicative. Clinicians in Illinois, Massachusetts

and Hawaii which, like Wisconsin, require the warning, apparently have had similar results.
See Miller, Miranda Comes to the Hospital: The Right to Remain Silent in Civil Commitment,
142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1074, 1077 (1985).
These findings may, however, be misleading. Mental patients may know, at some level, that

they are ill and talk because they know this is the best way to enable their doctors to treat
them. Military patients with HIV-related illness may also want to share their homosexuality
to maximize their treatment on one level, but their fear of adverse repercussion may, relative to

psychiatric patients' fears, be stronger.
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Whether a patient's trust would in fact be enhanced could be determined
empirically.
Careproviders who plan to reveal what patients tell them have another
option available. They can state what they intend to do to only those patients who they believe are about to divulge their homosexual conduct.
Caregivers taking this approach would, however, have to anticipate what
their response would be if a patient discloses information prior to the physician's warning.
In considering this latter possibility, the caregiver might conclude that the
patient already knew, or should have known, 5 that the military physician/
patient relationship is not confidential and therefore, that the patient was
responsible for the consequences of his disclosure. However, this assertion is
tenuous, in view of the previously noted fact - that an ailing patient is
particularly prone to distortion." Moreover, since many military caregivers
have treated patients' disclosures as confidential regardless of the reporting
requirements of their particular branch of service, patients have had valid
grounds for inferring that confidentiality would be maintained. Since the
careprovider is a member of the group which creates this ambiguity, he may
also have some responsibility to clarify this policy for the patient. Otherwise, the burdens resulting from this discrepancy, the burden of guessing
and particularly of guessing wrong, would fall wholly on the patient.
A caregiver who warned patients only when he anticipated that the patient would divulge homosexual behavior could, on the other hand, have
kept this information to himself if the patient disclosed the information prior
to his warning. The physician would then have to be prepared to suffer the
potential adverse consequences for remaining silent. Though punitive repercussions are unprecedented, they remain possible.
Should the military physician risk potential personal sanctions? It is posited that this question should be answered in the affirmative. 37 Since civilian
physicians have a moral obligation to treat patients with HIV-related illness
35. These assumptions that a patient already knows or should know are, of course, very
different in nature. The first is a factual assumption which may or may not be correct. The
second assumes a value priority and, therefore, is particularly subject to the caregivers' bias.
In this case, it takes for granted, for example, that all servicepersons have equal ability to
obtain and use information important to them and have equal opportunity to acquire this
ability.
36. Patients tend to perceive physicians as their helpers no matter what their situation.
See, e.g., P. APPELBAUM, CLINICAL HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 289 (1985).
37. See, e.g., Jonsen, AIDS and Ethics, 2 ISSUES SCI. & TECH. 56 (1986). Yet, whatever
the degree of present consensus, practice varies. Some surgeons, for example, refuse to do
elective procedures on patients with HIV because they are afraid that they might become
infected by nicking themselves with their scalpel. Some pathologists similarly fear that they

might make a slip and become infected and thus make arrangements with others less afraid to
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even at the risk of becoming infected themselves,3" it can be asserted that a
military caregiver should be willing to bear the less severe repercussions
which might result from his failure to divulge patients' disclosures to command. This position would appear to be particularly viable in view of the
fact that no military physician, to date, has been subjected to such repercussions. Consequently, on the basis of this consideration alone, it might not
only be praiseworthy for military careproviders to remain silent, but perhaps
morally obligatory as well.
What harm would these approaches involve? The military physician
would violate his obligations to the military. The military physician's primary responsibilities are to maintain the unit's health and to keep his commander informed on this matter so that this information can be used to
make prudent decisions. Like the average military serviceperson, the military physician is obligated to carry out his mandated objectives even when
personal needs might be sacrificed.39
When the military physician withholds information from his commander,
or indirectly prevents his commander from receiving it, as for example,
when he warns a patient prior to disclosure that his divulgement would be
reported, the physician fails to fulfill his second military objective - keeping
his commander informed about the health of his unit. Yet, in order for the
physician to fulfill his first military objective - protecting the unit's health
- a physician must maintain the trust of the military personnel. If the military physician reports patient disclosures," it is likely that the patient will
feel betrayed, and that he will withhold all future information. The Air
Force experience discussed previously is a case in point.4 As noted, Air
Force physicians discovered that when they could no longer offer servicepersons complete immunity, the patients stopped giving accurate information.
Accordingly, since that time the Air Force has been unable to obtain reliable
epidemiological data.
The most compelling justification for the approaches outlined above is
that they respect the patient's dignity. It is this consideration, primarily,
which requires that the military physician warn his patient of the potential
ramifications of his disclosure even when the physician believes that the paperform autopsies. The question of whether or not a physician should administer CPR when
no apparatus preventing mouth-to-mouth contact is available is also subject to differing views.
38. McCray, Occupational Risk of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome Among

Health Care Workers, 314 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1127 (1986).
39. See generally Ethical Issues, supra note 1.
40. See generally Smith, supra note 7.
41. Cheng Interview, supra note 12.
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tient's behavior should be reported.4 2
It is arguable that there are some instances in which other values should
take precedence. For example, if there is a significant likelihood that a military mission would be endangered, or that other significant harms would
occur, the goal of preventing these harms might prevail.4 3 In addition, in
many situations the serviceperson agrees in serving a particular role that if
health conditions occur which would potentially impair his functioning, he
will go to the military physician for treatment and accordingly, the physician
will act in accordance with the mission's needs." A serviceperson agrees to
these conditions, for example, when he becomes a pilot.45 In the situations
42. E.g., "In theory, I was supposed to turn in every gay guy who came in. You're supposed to tell every time, that's the rule." Moore, supra note 9, at 4, col. 2 (quoting Dr. David
Fletcher, a former Army doctor who worked with AIDS patients).
Ethically, military physicians who report all such patient disclosures may be pursuing a socalled "role-specific ethic" in which they accept the judgments of command and continue to
perform their duties without independently assessing which obligations - duties as military
officers, or as physicians - should prevail.
This approach furthers the authority of command, avoids unequal treatment among servicepersons making similar disclosures, and eliminates the physician's personal risk.
A military physician's subscribing to a role specific ethic in all situations is, however, both
theoretically and pragmatically problematic. For a discussion of these problems, see Ethical
Issues, supra note 1.
43. Numerous examples could be given. Dr. Richard Swengel, Colonel, MC, USA, a
neurosurgeon at Walter Reed Army Hospital presents the following scenario as a case in point.
His commander was informed shortly after the submarine went to sea that the child of one of
his servicemen had been killed. Consequently, the commander was presented with the dilemma whether or not to inform the serviceman and allow him to return home - an action
which would have interfered with the mission or inform the serviceman but require him to
remain - an action which would potentially interfere with his ability to perform his duties.
In this particular situation, a decision was made to inform the serviceman. This decision was
based, however, on the fact that the attending physician was familiar with this particular serviceman and was confident in his ability to cope with the situation. Since military policy today
precludes such information from being sent to submarines, it is unlikely that this particular
dilemma will reoccur.
For descriptions of other situations in which the needs of the military mission may prevail
over those of individual patients, see Colbach, Ethical Issues in Combat Psychiatry, 150 MIL.
MED. 256 (1981); Ethical Issues, supra note 1; Howe, supra note 1.
Any situation in which mass casualties occur in the military may potentially allow priority
to be given to the needs of the mission over those of individual patients. The principle of
military medical triage holds that soldiers other than those most severely wounded can be
treated when this is necessary to salvage "the greatest possible number of lives for the support
of the military mission." See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, EMERGENCY WAR
SURGERY (1st rev. ed. 1975). See generally Smith, Triage:Endgame Realities, 1 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 143 (1985).
44. When a serviceperson has a security clearance and has access to vital information or
works with nuclear weapons, society itself may be endangered. See infra pp. 124-25.
45. The time in which a pilot must react from the moment he first sees a plane in order to
avoid it is, for example, a matter of seconds. Since numerous factors could affect his reactions

124

Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 3:111

discussed here, however, the utilitarian arguments which favor a military
physician's reporting a patient's admissions are few.
How then should a physician's approach change when he encounters such
patients in the future? While the new law passed in 1986 protects servicepersons who disclose past behavior from most adverse actions,4 6 three situations remain potentially problematic. First, if a serviceperson with HIV
reveals the identity of his sexual partner and the sexual partner is a serviceperson, the partner could be subject to sanctions. A military physician
facing this dilemma will have choices similar in principle to those he confronted prior to the adoption of the new law, for example, deciding first
whether or not to report to command an identified partner and, if so,
whether to warn the patient. In this instance, however, this physician would
not have to warn all patients, but only those who acknowledged homosexual
behavior.
Second, the military may specially reconsider a patient's security clearance and possibly revoke it if the patient's homosexual behavior is disclosed.
Here, the arguments in favor of the military physician respecting the patient's interests are the same as before the passage of the 1986 law, but the
relative importance which such a situation presents to the military and the
and endanger not only his crew but himself, he accepts responsibility for bringing himself to
the military physician for conditions he knows may ground him.
One of the few situations in which patients are permitted to incriminate themselves in civilian settings is when they plead insanity as an excuse to a crime. Self-incrimination is allowed
in this particular instance because the patients' thoughts, at the time of the crime - information necessary to establish insanity - are unobtainable otherwise. See, e.g., Note, Requiring a
Criminal Defendant to Submit to a Government Psychiatric Examination: An Invasion of the
PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination, 83 HARv. L. REV. 648 (1970).
The conflict which then arises if patients have the right to remain silent and to plead insanity
is whether or not the jury should be permitted to infer sanity from the patient's choice to
remain silent. See, e.g., Matz, The Sounds of Silence: Post MirandaSilence and the Inference
of Sanity, 65 B.U.L. REV. 1025 (1985).
Potentially, an analogous question could be raised concerning the inference military physicians could make when a serviceperson fails to answer questions regarding his homosexual
relations. Cf Gayer v. Schlesinger, 490 F.2d 740, 751, 753 n.28: "[A] willful failure or refusal
to furnish or to authorize the furnishing of relevant and material information may prevent the
Department of Defense from reaching the affirmative finding required ... in which event any
security clearance then in effect shall be suspended .... " (The plaintiffs in this case had,
however, informed their investigator that they were leading active homosexual lives; they refused to give details on the ground that this invaded their privacy.).
This is most implausible, but illustrates that even the physician who believes it is his duty to
report all patients stops short of going as far in reporting his suspicions as an investigator
might. Cf supra note 31.
46. The term "adverse personnel action," is to be distinguished from "adverse security
determination." In the latter, a greater national interest is at stake and the burden on the
government when making claims which oppose a serviceperson's interests is accordingly less.
See generally supra note 5.
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nation when the patient has such a clearance is greater. Consequently, the
issue is whether the military physician should report homosexual disclosures
made by a serviceperson with HIV infection when such a patient has a security clearance, and, if so, should the patient be warned.
Under these particular circumstances, the physician's obligation to the
military and society is stronger and therefore, the question of withholding
such information is more problematic. Yet, it is suggested that a gay serviceperson's homosexual behavior alone should not jeopardize his clearance
status but rather, the fact that he, as any other individual, is less than trustworthy should. Thus, a military physician might take into account this consideration and assess for himself whether or not the homosexual patient
seems trustworthy.
47
If the physician attempts to make this differentiation himself, theoretically the so-called role-specific ethic would be violated. If the military physician reports all patients with security clearances who divulge their
homosexual behavior, because this behavior represents an increased likelihood that the serviceperson is untrustworthy, from the standpoint of equity,
he should also report servicepersons for other behaviors which similarly suggest that they are not wholly trustworthy, such as those who show increased
alcohol use, depression, or sexual promiscuity."
But if the military physician elects to report all or even some homosexual
servicepersons, should the physician then warn these patients beforehand?
This is a close call. In most situations, military or civilian, the physician
using his medical role to exploit a patient's vulnerability, even for substantial
interests of others, has been questioned. 49 Yet, this could represent an exem47. See discussion supra note 42.
48. The value which may be violated here is equity. A criticism which has been raised
against some military practices regarding gay servicepersons is that they discriminate against
this group. Cf. supra notes 2 & 13 for other examples in which discrimination has been
claimed.
From the standpoint of equity, commanders may be seen to be enforcing one but not other
aspects of military law when they take actions against homosexual servicepersons. See, e.g.,
supra note 9 (the instance of the Navy bringing charges against a homosexual serviceperson
with HIV having sexual contact with another man in his car). The military law against sodomy states "Any person who engages in unnatural carnal copulation is guilty of sodomy. Unnatural copulation includes oral and anal sex with persons of the same or opposite sex."
Executive Order 12473, 49 Fed. Reg. 17,152 (1984). Equal treatment under this law would
seemingly require that similar charges be brought against any serviceperson with HIV engaging in heterosexual contact. But see Gayer, 490 F.2d at 747 n.14, in which an official of a
clearance program was asked "whether [the] criminality of other kinds of sexual activity proscribed by statute - such as fornication, heterosexual sodomy, adultery - were afforded the
same treatment [as homosexual conduct]." He responded that they were not unless there was
specific reason to suspect the activity might render the individual susceptible to blackmail.
49. An example of this in the military context is when the physicians treat civilians in
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plary case in which the military physician would be justified in using his
medical role to "entrap" the patient (by misleading the patient about what
the physician would do).
Additional considerations are also germane. Practically, what is the likelihood that dire consequences would occur solely because a military physician
did not report the homosexual behavior of a serviceperson with HIV who
has a security clearance? The courts have questioned whether homosexual
behavior, per se, poses a general risk to the military.5" Moreover, even if the
risk were substantial, the indignity done to a serviceperson by "entrapment"
could render the values which the military is protecting worthless. As the
late Justice William 0. Douglas stated:
[The] concept of "national defense" cannot be deemed an end in
itself .... Implicit in the term "national defense" is the notion of
defending those values and ideals which set this nation apart ....
It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of national defense, we
would sanction the subversion of . . . those liberties . . . which
[make] the defense of the nation worthwhile .... "
Under a third situation, a small percentage of patients,5 2 though not hayoccupied territory in part for military gain. Such gain, for example, was obtained in Vietnam
when paramedics treating civilians were able to acquire vital information on enemy troop locations. This information was often obtained from the spouses of North Vietnamese troops. See
Bourne, The Hippocratic Revolt, The Army Physician and Vietnam, 6 RAMPARTS 57, 58
(1967). See generally R. VEATCH, CASE STUDIES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 61-64 (1977); Neel,
The Medical Role in Army Stability Operations, 132 MIL. MED. 605 (1967) (for the military
rationale in treating such civilians); Vastyan, Warriors in White; Some Questions About the
Nature and Mission ofMilitary Medicine, 32 TEX. REP. BIOL. MED. 327 (1974); EthicalIssues,
supra note 1; Howe, supra note 1.
In occupied territories, however, such care benefits its recipients and for this additional
reason especially, in the past, it has been given even when it was known that enemy soldiers
were among those who would be treated. See Health Care for Civilians, Problems of War
Victims in Indo China: HearingBefore the Subcomm. to Investigate Problems Connected with
Refugees and Escapees, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972) (testimony of J. Ferger ) (for a description
of conditions existing in civilian hospitals during the Vietnam conflict).
Furthermore, international law attempts to limit the use of destructive weaponry. It would
be inconsistent, in this regard, to preclude medical care which benefits the enemy as a means of
pursuing military goals.
Civilian doctors face analogous conflicts in a variety of contexts, such as when deciding
whether or not to place a wanted criminal's picture in a dermatology journal. See Gaylin,
What's an FBI PosterDoing in a Nice Journal Like That?, 2 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 2 (Apr.
1972). All physicians who make their livelihood caring for patients in a sense exploit these
patients for profit. See Ethical Issues, supra note 1 for a discussion of criteria for the distinction between morally permissible and impermissible exploitation.
50. See sources cited supra note 4.
51. United States v. United States Dist. Court For the E.D. Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 332
(1972) (quoting United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967)).
52. See Norman, supra note 10. See also Engel, infra note 60, at A7, col. 1.
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ing a security clearance, might for personal reasons (other than fear of military sanctions) not want to reveal previous homosexual behavior. In this
instance, patients who reveal homosexuality because they feel strong pressure from military physicians to do so would "subjectively" be harmed,
though the information they give might benefit others.5 3
The situation of these servicepersons could be seen as ethically comparable to that of research subjects. (This analogy can be drawn because the
patients are ill, and particularly because the patients suffer from a disease
which has no cure). When their situation is construed in this manner, all
reasonable efforts should be taken to maximize their autonomy. As Jonas
has stated:
[A patient's] physical state, psychic preoccupation, dependent relation to the doctor, the submissive attitude induced by treatment everything connected with his condition and situation makes the
sick person inherently less of a sovereign person than the healthy
[C]onsent is marred by lower resistance or captive cirone ....
cumstances, and so on .... This ... puts a heightened onus on the
physician-researcher to limit his undue power to [the] most imporobjectives and, of course, to keep pertant and defensible research
54
suasion at a minimum.
The military physician could implicitly exploit these patients' situations
by merely informing them that they were protected from adverse sanctions
and then taking a sexual history. Alternatively, a physician could enhance
such a patient's decision-making capacity by inquiring prior to taking a sexual history whether the patient had concerns about divulging homosexual
behavior and whether he would like to discuss them prior to deciding what
to reveal. Even gay patients who choose to reveal their homosexuality
should appreciate the offer, and persons who are not gay should recognize
also, at some level, that military physicians, in asking this question, are respecting all servicepersons.
But would the epidemiological data otherwise gained from this small
group of patients justify not "warning" them? Clearly, the findings obtained
from disclosure made by these patients could potentially benefit persons in
53. Jonas in his classic article on human experimentation states: "For what objectives
connected with the medico-biological sphere should ... harm [to] human subjects [in] experimentation [be permitted]? We postulated that this must not be just a worthy cause ... but a
cause qualifying for transcendent social sanction ....

Extraordinary damage excuses ex-

traordinary needs." Jonas, PhilosophicalReflections in Experimenting with Human Subjects,
in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS (T. Beauchamp & L. Walters eds. 1978).
54. Id. at 418. For specific adverse sanctions from which such servicepersons would be
protected, see National Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 1987, Pub. L. No. 99-661,
tit. 7, § 705(c), 100 Stat. 3816, 3904 (1986) (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 1102).
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this country and the world." The key considerations in a military physician's decision should be the actual importance of this information weighed
against the greater respect shown and benefit to patients who choose not to
reveal previous homosexual behavior.56 The former in most instances would
probably be equivocal, the latter never.
II.

MAXIMIZING PATIENTS' AUTONOMY

Patients with HIV-related illnesses sometimes evoke strong negative feelings in their caregivers for a variety of reasons. These may range from
careproviders having prejudice against homosexuals and drug users,5 7 to a
fear that they might acquire HIV from the patients.58 Civilian and military
medical personnel who have these feelings may knowingly or unknowingly
"act them out" through acts ranging from taking a biopsy of a patient's
nasal mucosa after a nosebleed "to eliminate all diagnostic uncertainty," to
performing repeated bone marrow aspirations even when the results would
not affect a patient's treatment.
This hostility can also be expressed on an institutional level. For instance,
patients with HIV infection who would customarily be referred for counseling or inpatient treatment for alcoholism,59 might have these resources
55. The United Kingdom has not initiated compulsory testing of military recruits but
faces the ethical dilemma of having to find other ways to monitor the spread of HIV in the
British population at large. It would be possible, for example, to test blood samples taken for

other purposes. But this would be problematic, because subjects found to be positive would
have to be informed and their permission to be tested and informed would then not have been
obtained. For a further discussion of this issue see Newmark, AIDS/Confused Ethics of Blood
Testing, 322 NATURE 296 (1986).
56. See generally Lipsett, On the Nature and Ethics of Phase I Clinical Trials of Cancer
Chemotherapies, 248 J. A.M.A. 942 (1982) in which Lipsett states that:
"The conduct of this process [of obtaining the informed consent of patients in therapeutic research] must also meet the requirement of autonomy of the patient to be
respected. In practice, this means that the patient and physician discuss the purpose
and methods of the trial and its risks and benefits and that at the end the patient
understands as completely as possible."
57. See Wolcott & Faway, supra note 16.
58. See Christ & Wiener, supra note 16; Furstenbergh, supra note 16; Wolcott & Faway,
supra note 16. See also Beauchamp, A Second AIDS Epidemic, N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1983, at
21, col. 1; Morgenthau, Gay America in Transition, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 1983, at 30.
59. Patients with HIV-related illness, like others, may drink alcohol to relieve their anxiety. Likewise, persons who abuse alcohol may be exceptionally vulnerable to acquiring HIVrelated illness due to poor self-care. Inpatient treatment may be more successful than outpatient treatment at preventing alcohol and drug abuse because it provides a better support group
which can be utilized by the patient to deal with his health related stress. Flavin, The Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and Suicidal Behavior in Alcohol-Dependent Homosexual Men, 143 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1440 (1986).
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withheld. Rationales might be offered to justify this discrimination, 6 but its
apparent logic may be misleading. The claim might be made, for example,
that the needs of these patients are "excessive" and thus, if their needs were
met, other patients would suffer. While this claim may be true, taken out of
context, other patients who do not have HIV-related disease may also have
"excessive" needs and yet receive treatment. Furthermore, resources might
be available to meet the needs of both groups of patients having "excessive"
needs, but sufficient effort to acquire such needed resources not undertaken.
Ethically, the military has already placed added burdens on servicepersons with HIV-related illness by requiring them to be screened. Some have
undoubtedly benefited from learning that they have this illness, but some
might have chosen not to be tested. 6 ' The military's requirement that servicepersons go to medical centers for evaluation of their illness may also, in
some cases, have exposed patients' homosexual lifestyles. 62 The importance
60. Discrimination against patients with HIV infection may also represent racial discrimination. Black military recruits test four times higher than whites for HIV infection and blacks
and Hispanics account for 40 percent of U.S. AIDS cases. Engel, Black Recruits' AIDS Exposure Rate Four Times That of Whites, Tests Show, Wash. Post, July 19, 1986, at A7, col. 1;
Russell, Blacks and HispanicsSuffer High AIDS Rate, Wash. Post, Oct. 24, 1986, at A17, col.
1.
Concern about adverse effects which might result if AIDS were identified as a minority
health problem has apparently interfered with some education programs. See generally Russell, supra.
61. Gary McDonald of the AIDS Action Council, which represents 110 local AIDS organizations, for example, counsels persons not to get tested. See Russell, supra note 60; see also
U.S. Recommends Wider AIDS Testing, Wash. Post, Mar. 14, 1986, at A15, col. 1. Dr. Harvey Fineberg, Dean of the Harvard School of Public Health, supports this approach, he states
that "Testing ... imposes devastating knowledge on an individual that he has a right not to
know. An individual has a right to insulate himself from bad news." Morganthau, The AIDS
Epidemic/FutureShock, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 1986, at 30, 39.
62. In some instances, screening procedures have resulted in servicepersons' informing
their families, which otherwise they would have chosen not to do. In one study of civilians, for
example, four out of five homosexual men with HIV had not told their families of their homosexuality. Coppola, Coming Out of the Closet, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8, 1983, at 34.
Servicepersons with HIV have also suffered other additional burdens. Screening has resulted in some servicepersons returning to units in which they have been harassed or ostracized. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 9, at A8, col. 1 (quoting Dr. John B. McClain, Chief of
Infectious Disease Service at Walter Reed who stated that: "Some have been woken up [at
Walter Reed] in the middle of the night with 'Hey Joe, isn't it time for your HTLV-III [AIDS]
test?' And they didn't know anyone knew.")
An unreported case brought to the attention of the author is illustrative. According to one
serviceperson, after leaving his post to be medically evaluated, he was told by his boss to get
another assignment and not return. The serviceman tried to change assignments but this did
not work out. When eventually he returned to his duty station, he found himself shunned for
being a homosexual and "having the plague," and then sought support from his parents. They
in turn told him that they loved him but he couldn't live with them and during his brief stay
washed his silverware and plates with alcohol after each meal he ate.
Another harm to which servicepersons with HIV may also be exposed is bureaucratic in
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presently given to protecting the privacy of civilian patients, in comparison,
is exemplified by a National Institute of Health ("NIH") panel's recommendation that blood donors be given a "check-off" form on which they can
indicate that their blood not be transfused so that persons with HIV can give
blood without exposing others to their disease.6 3
Equity would require that under normal circumstances patients with HIV

receive the same treatment as patients with other illnesses. Since the military has imposed extra burdens, it may have some supererogatory duty to
meet these patients' needs even if they are deemed excessive. Institutional
64
discrimination, therefore, if it must exist at all, should favor these patients.
Patients with HIV-related illness are vulnerable to individual or institutional discrimination, and, as with other patients, are particularly vulnerable
when they undergo mental deterioration, which occurs in perhaps as many
as fifty percent of AIDS patients, and often results in their total incompetency. 65 For example, a physician may not treat one patient with HIV-related illness when he feels hostility towards that patient on the grounds that
such treatment is futile, but continue to treat a patient with another illness,

who has an identical chance of survival, for whom he feels no hostility.66
Alternatively a physician may discriminate between patients with HIV-related illness. If two AIDS patients have an infection such as pneumocystis
nature. AIDS patients can spend up to five months in the hospital awaiting medical retirement. Moore, supra note 9, at A8, col. 1.

63. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE
STATEMENT/THE IMPACT OF ROUTINE HTLV-III ANTIBODY TESTING OF BLOOD AND
PLASMA DONORS ON PUBLIC HEALTH (July 7-9, 1986) [hereinafter NIH CONSENSUS REPORT]. See also Squires, Panel Urges Donating Blood for Own Use to Cut AIDS Risk, Wash.
Post, July 10, 1986, at A5, col. 1.
64. Some have asserted that patients who have acquired HIV through homosexual behavior, prostitution and IV drug use are not equally deserving of treatment because they have
acquired their illness through their own volition. Discriminating against these patients for this
reason would, however, violate equity unless other patients with behaviors such as smoking
and lack of exercise, which similarly pose self-induced risks to health, were also treated differently. If behaviors such as these were accepted as a valid ground for discriminating against
these individuals, persons with HIV might still warrant treatment more than those who, for
example, continue to smoke, because many patients with HIV lacked knowledge at the time
they engaged in high risk behaviors that acquiring HIV was a potential risk.
65. Perry & Markowitz, supra note 16, at 1002. See also Navia, Dementia Complicating
AIDS, 16 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 158 (1986); Snider, Simpson, Nielson, Gold, Metroka & Posner, Neurological Complicationsof Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome: Analysis of 50 Patients, 14 ANN. NEUROLOGY 403 (1983) [hereinafter Snider & Simpson]. These patients may
also undergo other illnesses such as depression which may further impair their capacity to
choose freely.
66. See Steinbrook, Lo, Tirpack, Dilley & Volberding, Ethical Dilemmas in Caringfor
Patients with the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 103 ANN. INT'L MED. 787 (1985)
[hereinafter Steinbrook & Lo].
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pneumonia (a condition where the survival rate approaches only fourteen
percent if intubation is required), 67 a physician might stop treating a young
homosexual intravenous ("IV") drug user on the rationale that treatment is
futile, but continue to treat a sixty year old man who acquired AIDS from a
blood transfusion.68
Caregivers, in both civilian and military settings may also discriminate
against patients with HIV-related illness not only because they feel hostility,
but also because they wish to further cost/benefit interests. Some physicians
routinely refuse to admit patients with do-not-resuscitate orders ("DNR's")
to intensive care units ("ICU's"). 69 Other physicians attempt to persuade
elderly patients to decline certain options, such as being admitted to an ICU
or continuing renal dialysis, by informing them that if they use these resources, these resources may become unavailable for younger patients. Still
other physicians attempt to persuade terminally ill patients to request DNR
orders by sharing with them the worst outcomes that could be expected if
they were resuscitated. In each case, the physician hopes to save both staff
time and societal resources.
As the number of patients with HIV-related illness has increased, allocating resources justly to this group has become pragmatically difficult. Some
AIDS patients in New York City reportedly receive "cheap" hospice care
instead of optimal treatment.70 In some military and civilian centers in
which AIDS patients are concentrated, if AIDS patients' needs were optimally met, they would occupy all the ICU beds. 7'
The degree to which the needs and wishes of patients with HIV-related
illness requiring hospitalization can be met is limited by the resources which
can be made available. As an initial cost-trimming measure, scarce resources could be withheld from patients with HIV-related illness when probable benefits are marginal, to make these resources available to other patients
67. Murray, Pulmonary Complications of the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, Report of a NationalHeart,Lung, and Blood Institute Workshop, 310 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1682

(1984).
68. Steinbrook & Lo, supra note 66.
69. Even if some system of limiting admissions is necessary, this may discriminate among
patients who have similar illnesses but have or have not requested DNR orders. Since some
patients might withdraw their DNR order if they needed ICU treatment and knew they might
not be admitted on this basis, keeping this knowledge from affected patients is ethically
questionable.
70. Calazza, Correspondence, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1191 (1986).

71. See Steinbrook & Lo,supra note 66. In the military, resources at several facilties are
being "drained." See also statement of Dr. William Cline, AIDS Program Coordinator at
Walter Reed who states that "Almost every department at the [Walter Reed Army) Medical
Center has become involved in the AIDS program, diverting many health officers from other
duties." Moore, supra note 9, at A4, col. 1.
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including those with HIV-related illness.7 2 When there are no relevant medical differences between patients with AIDS and other patients, however,
cost saving should also include other groups which would benefit.7 3
Yet, which considerations are "medically relevant" can be widely interpreted. Who determines what is medically relevant is therefore of the utmost significance.74 If someone other than the treating physicians make this
assessment, the doctors can remain advocates for their patients. Yet, since
the physicians most involved know the most about their patients, they are in
the best position to judge their relative medical prospects.
In the military, it might be preferable for physicians to remain advocates
for their patients by referring decisions involving two or more patients' conflicting interests to persons not involved in the patients' clinical care. Three
rationales support this approach. First, patients with HIV should be able to
trust military physicians as much as possible. These patients are already
exceptionally vulnerable in any setting due to the seriousness of their illness
and the corresponding social stigma. Any degree to which this additional
distrust can be offset will benefit the patient. Second, military physicians
frequently change geographic locations. Thus, it is likely that patients will
see several doctors during the course of their illnesses. Again, to whatever
extent patients can develop trust under these circumstances is desirable.
Third, military physicians customarily work as a unit. Practically, it would
therefore, in most instances, be easy for the military physician to arrange for
persons outside the treatment relationship to decide questions involving the
allocation of limited resources. This approach is already being implemented
in some military hospitals to deal with such matters as blood shortages.
When it appears that resources will be inadequate, military careproviders
may also have some obligation to explore whether resources can be made
available,75 or might be available elsewhere76 prior to implementing measures to decide who gets treated and who does not.
In the military, this obligation might include, for instance, making sure
72. Steinbrook & Lo, supra note 66. See also Veatch, DRG's and the Ethical Reallocation
of Resources, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 32, 38 (June 1986).
73. Steinbrook & Lo, supra note 66. See also Engelhardt, Intensive Care Units, Scarce
Resources and Conflicting Principlesof Justice, 255 J. A.M.A. 1159, 1162 (1986).
74. Steinbrook & Lo, supra note 66; Veatch, supra note 72; see also Dyer, Should Doctors
Cut Costs at the Bedside?, 16 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 5 (Feb. 1986); Knaus, Rationing Justice
and the American Physician, 255 J. A.M.A. 1176 (1986); Miller, Sounding Board/Why Saying
No to Patients in the United States is so Hard, 314 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1380 (1986); Morreim,
The MD and DRG, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30 (June 1985); Strauss, Rationing ofIntensive
Care Unit Services, 255 J. A.M.A. 1143 (1986); Zawacki, ICU Physician's Ethical Role in
DistributingScarce Resources, 13 CRITICAL CARE MED. 57 (1985).

75. Steinbrook & Lo, supra note 66.
76. Englehardt, supra note 73.

19871

HIV Testing in the Military

that persons responsible for allocating resources are aware that shortages
exist, and when this fails, recommending alternative civilian sources available to meet military demands. Although servicepersons requiring some
treatments would not have to pay if they received military care, they might
have to pay considerable amounts of money if they chose to be treated in
civilian hospitals. Nonetheless, patients should be informed of this option
because it might enhance their trust in the attending physician.77
If resources are totally unavailable, however, deciding between patients'
interests is necessary. While utilitarian approaches could be considered,78
there is presently no societal consensus concerning which values should be
prioritized; consequently the adoption of any one approach by a military
physician or a military institution would be highly arbitrary.7 9
If random selection, or some other method of choosing between patients is
ultimately undertaken, the question then arises whether or not caregivers
should inform patients with HIV why they were denied treatment. In Great
Britain some physicians reportedly neglect to tell a patient that he could
benefit from dialysis if such treatment is not readily available. 8 ° Informing
patients in such cases would undoubtedly be exceedingly painful, but informing them in spite of this pain would respect the patient's dignity and
might also enhance the possibility that they or persons acting on their behalf
might be able to obtain the resources that are lacking.
When resources can be provided, most patients with HIV-related illness
seem to benefit from having the opportunity to help plan their treatment. In
one study of homosexual AIDS patients, for example, an overwhelming majority of those surveyed wanted to discuss with their physicians what they
would want done if they became incompetent, even though they found these
discussions difficult at the time.8 1 In general, these discussions apparently
helped patients feel more in control, and helped some better cope with their
illness.8 2
When careproviders should introduce the question of advance directives is
77. If, on the other hand, patients with HIV were being discriminated against, or these
patients perceived that the lack of resources was due to discrimination, informing them would
diminish their trust.
78. Childress, Who Shall Live When Not All Can Live, 53 SOUNDINGS 339 (1970).
79. See Englehardt, supra note 73. These authors suggest that a group of patients who
might be given lower priority than others are those who could not care for themselves. For a

discussion of the application of such an approach to dialysis, see Rescher, The Allocation of
Exotic Medical Life Saving Therapy, 79 ETHICS 173 (1969).
80. Schwartz, Why Britain Can't Afford Informed Consent, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
19 (Aug. 1985).

81. Steinbrook & Lo, supra note 66.
82. Presentation of Mr. Temoshok at the APA Annual Meeting, entitled A Longitudinal
Psychosocial Study of AIDS and AIDS-Related Complex (May 13, 1986).
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presently unclear. At one hospital, this discussion is initiated within hours
of the patient's admission. Some patients report, however, that they would
prefer discussing this question when they become outpatients; and others
report that they would prefer delaying such discussions until after they have
come to know their physician better.8 3 Discussing advance directives is also
difficult for careproviders. 84 AIDS patients, like many with terminal illness,
may tend to overestimate their. chances of survival.85 Consequently, some
patients may feel that caregivers who raise such questions deny them hope.86
In any case, the decision whether to die an earlier death by withholding
treatment or undergo greater pain by receiving treatment is agonizing. 87 It
is in these instances, however, that a patient's personal preference is most
important;8 8 the patient alone can choose what is for him the "least worst
death." 89
When caregivers initiate this discussion they should determine what it is
that their patients want. Patients may, for instance, state that they want
maximum treatment, but in actuality only want to be kept free from suffering.9" If the careprovider is not free to be the patient's advocate, he may
have greater difficulty pursuing the patient's interests dispassionately. He
might be more likely, for example, to persuade the patient that what he really wants is to be free of suffering when the patient's genuine wish is to
maximize life.
Careproviders should probably initiate such discussions with all patients
who have advanced stages of HIV-related illness, which under the Walter
Reed staging classification 9 ' would include patients in stages WR 3 and
above. In general, caregivers should initiate patient discussions early in the
course of the illness since patients with HIV-related illness may have even
more anxiety and depression than patients with AIDS, presumably because
they feel more uncertain concerning their future.92 Discussion should be
initiated in outpatient settings but only after physicians have had an opportunity to get to know their patient.
83. Steinbrook & Lo, supra note 66.
84. Steinbrook, supra note 6.
85. Id.
86. Jonsen, supra note 37.

87. Id.
88. Kassirer, The Toss-up, 305 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1467 (1981).
89. Battin, The Least Worst Death, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 13 (Apr. 1983).
90. Steinbrook, supra note 6.
91. Redfield, Wright & Tramont, The Walter Reed Staging Classificationfor HTL V-111
LAV Infection, 314 NEW ENG. J. MED. 131, 132 (1986). Patients in stages WR 3 and above
are extremely likely to subsequently develop AIDS.

92. Presentation of Susan Tross at the APA Annual Meeting, entitled Psychological Impact of AIDS Spectrum Disorders (May 13, 1986).
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When the extent of a serviceperson's illness is not ascertained until he is at
a medical center for evaluation and staging, discussion of the patient's advance directives might best be delayed until he can resume an outpatient
status. Military careproviders should know at the time what is possible in
the jurisdiction in which they treat patients and share these options with
them. When, for example, homosexual AIDS patients want sexual partners
to make choices for them if they become incompetent, this may be accomplished by means of a Durable Power of Attorney9 3 or Living Will.94 Military careproviders can seek legal assistance to determine whether these or
other options are available in the jurisdiction in which they practice. In civilian settings patients sometimes encounter difficulty implementing this desire because family or next of kin are customary surrogate decision-makers.
In the military patients who feel reluctant to divulge homosexual conduct
will particularly need encouragement to appoint a sexual partner the proxy
decision-maker. Even if the military physician believes that he must report
whatever the patient discloses regarding prior sexual activity, the patient
could still be informed that they can pursue their desire to appoint a sexual
partner as a surrogate without explicitly divulging prior homosexual
activity.
Military policy may not permit persons other than family or next-of-kin to
participate in decisions regarding incompetent patients.9 5 In these instances,
caregivers might help a patient who wishes to appoint a sexual partner surrogate decision-maker to bring his request before a civil court. There have
been cases in which military policy that prevented a patient from having
certain decisions implemented have been overruled by a civil court. An exemplary case is that of Tune v. Walter Reed MedicalHospital.96 In the Tune
case, Martha Tune, a seventy-one year old patient who was initially denied
her request to discontinue her artificial respiratory support because of an
93. Steinbrook, supra note 6. See also Steinbrook & Lo, Decision Makingfor Incompetent
Patients by DesignatedProxy, 310 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1598 (1984).
94. Bryan, How Dignifieda Death?- Living Wills, 31 MED. TRIAL TECH. Q. 209 (1984).
95. Do-Not-Resuscitate or "No-Code" Orders, Update AR 40-3 (Feb. 15, 1985) [hereinafter DNR]. Chapter 19 (19.7d) states, "After assessment of the benefits [for or against resuscitation] there may be agreement between the attending physician and the patient's NOK

[next-of-kin] or legal guardian. If so ....

a DNR order will be entered on the patient's medical

record."
Withdrawal of Life Support, DASG-PSQ HQDA LTR 40-85, Reference AR 40-3, [herein-

after Withdrawal of Life Support]. Section forty-six states "[regarding withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment] when a patient is incompetent, a decision based on the patient's best interest
should be rendered after consultation with the patient's guardian or NOK and the attending

physician."
96. 602 F. Supp. 1452 (D.D.C. 1985).
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existing military policy, won her case on appeal to a civilian court.9 7
Military caregivers might also take the initiative in asking AIDS patients,
in later stages of their illness, whether or not they wish to make a will or
funeral arrangements. The latter option is especially important since some
funeral homes will not accept or embalm AIDS patients or even give them
funerals with open caskets.9 8 Patients with HIV-related illness in military
hospitals again could be particularly reluctant to make a will and give belongings to a homosexual partner if they feared the potential ramification of
their disclosure. Ideally, patients with HIV-related illness whose families are
not near by and who want a homosexual partner to discuss funeral arrangements with their physician should have the opportunity to do so. Again,
caregivers could inform patients who are confronted with this dilemma that
they can carry out these plans without having to reveal their prior homosexual conduct. If patients are delirious and their family is absent, friends or
homosexual partners may be exceptionally helpful in assisting these patients
to maintain control. If a patient's psychiatric status is extremely impaired,
friends or homosexual partners may also help in arranging for institutional
care.
In general, military careproviders should attempt to show AIDS patients
and their sexual partners as much respect and care as they would any patient's family or spouse. If, for instance, a patient with terminal cancer asks
that treatment be withheld or that a do-not-resuscitate order be written, and
that his family not be informed of these requests, a careprovider might, on
ethical grounds, choose not to comply. The physician may believe that if a
patient keeps this information from his family it will create emotional distance between them and leave them feeling painfully isolated from one another.9 9 An AIDS patient might make a similar request - that his sexual
97. Id. Ms. Tune had terminal adenocarcinoma of the pericardium. She seemed clearly
competent when informed that if she were removed from her respirator, she would "very likely
quickly die." Id. at 1453. She acknowledged that she had "no reservations at all." Id. The
physicians at Walter Reed were sympathetic to her desire to die a natural death, but were
unable to comply with her wishes because of an existing Army policy which prohibited removal of a respirator.
98. E.g., Okie, AIDS Victim Fightsfor Rights of Others, Wash. Post, June 15, 1986, at Al,
col. 4. (Don Miller surveyed 98 funeral homes in the Baltimore area; 56 indicated some form
of discrimination such as refusing to handle AIDS victims' bodies to embalm them or refusing
to provide services with open caskets).
Funeral directors are not the only persons refusing to care for or limit their interactions with
the bodies of AIDS patients. In the Spring of 1986, for example, Dr. Andrew McBride, the
D.C. Public Health Commissioner, personally removed the body of a deceased AIDS patient
after city crews refused to move him. Engel, supra note 60.
99. In either case, the military physician choosing not to comply with patients' requests
would be violating explicit Army policies which instruct careproviders to respect such patients'
confidentiality. E.g., "[W]here the competent patient requests that family members not be
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partner not be informed. The caregiver in this situation, on the basis of the
same concern, might tell the patient that while he will not disclose his condition, he will inform the partner that he (the physician) has a policy of keeping such information confidential.
If a caregiver tells a patient's partner of his policy, this could, of course,
alert the partner to the nature of the patient's request. As a result, the patient and his partner, like the patient and his family, might not become isolated from each other. While this approach is paternalistic and coercive, the
careprovider could still show care for the patient by explaining his rationale
and indicating that he is willing to join the patient and his partner if and
when they discuss the patient's wishes. °
III.

DECIDING WHETHER OR NOT TO INTERVENE TO PROTECT THIRD
PARTIES FROM ACQUIRING INFECTIONS
FROM PATIENTS WITH

HIV

When a patient with HIV-related illness is not willing to inform his spouse
or sex partner that he has this disease, careproviders may want to inform the
partner themselves but may be hesitant to do so from a fear that the patient
might sue them. Ethically, there are several arguments which support a
caregiver's decision to inform a patient's partner in this situation, even when
the patient is asymptomatic. The partner might already be infected, but he
could avoid repeated exposure,' 1 exceptional stress,1" 2 and exposing subsequent sexual partners. 0 3 A woman, for example, could avoid getting pregnant' °4 or if pregnant, perhaps choose to get an abortion.
involved in or informed of his or her decision, the patient's decision and request for confidentiality will be documented in the medical record." DNR, supra note 95, at (19.6.d); and a
competent, alert patient might elect not to inform family members of his decision [to withhold
or withdraw life-sustaining treatment] or seek their concurrence. Such decision will be documented in the medical record. Withdrawal of Life Support, supra note 95, at (19.a).
100. For a discussion of the ethical aspects of this situation see Howe, When Physicians
Impose Values on Patients/An Ethics Consultant's Responsibilities, in Ethics Consultation in
Health Care (J.C. Fletcher ed.)(unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Ethics Consultation in
Health Care]; see also Presentation of Edmund Howe at the APA Annual Meeting, entitled
Emerging Dilemmas in Consultation Liaison Psychiatry (May 13, 1986) [hereinafter Howe
Presentation].
101. Human immunodeficiency virus appears less likely to be transmitted by a single contact than other sexually transmitted infections. The likelihood of transmission to a sexual
partner after a single heterosexual exposure is only 1%. However, the likelihood of obtaining
HIV increases to between 10% and 50% when the heterosexual relations occur on a frequent
basis. Peterman & Curran, Sexual Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus, 256 J.
A.M.A. 2222, 2224 (1986).
102. Id.
103. Id. A partner could also seek earlier treatment for signs of opportunistic infection.
104. Id. at 2224.
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A careprovider's potential legal liability may depend on whether the patient has AIDS or a less severe HIV-related illness.' °5 If a patient has
AIDS, a caregiver who informs the partner is less likely to be civilly liable.' 6 Such an act would probably be construed as preventing the transmission of a highly communicable disease or perhaps, preventing the
commission of a crime. In nearly half the states, knowing transmission of a
communicable disease to other persons is a crime,10 7 and some AIDS patients have been specifically told that if they engage in unsafe sexual practice
they will be criminally prosecuted.' 0
All states presently require physicians to report cases of AIDS. Public
health officials could probably attempt to reach AIDS patients' sexual contacts now, but have not because the usual justification, preventing the spread
of illness through curative treatment, does not exist for AIDS as it does for
many other HIV-related illness.I°9 The major preventative measure is education. 10 The law generally grants patients greater protection when their
HIV-related illness is less severe than AIDS. Physicians are not required to
report patients with HIV-related illness less severe than AIDS except in Colorado, in which the board of health requires doctors and laboratories to report the names and address of persons testing positively for HIV. 111 A
California statute, on the other hand, forbids disclosing the results of HIV
antibody testing without written authority of the person tested. 1 2 Accord105. Mills, Legal Aspects ofInfectious Disease Practice: Typhoid Mary and Other Hazards,
Ill MED. TIMES 83 (1983).
Mills acknowledges that "[i]mproper disclosure of the illness may [result in the patient with
AIDS making] a civil claim for damages against the person making the wrongful disclosure,"
and then states, "nevertheless, such disclosure is proper to those unequivocally at risk." Mills,
Crofsy & Mills, Special Report, The Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 314 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 931, 932 (1986) [hereinafter Mills & Crofsy]. They go on to add that "[i]n cases of
AIDS, disclosures of a similar narrow scope - to the patient's spouse or lover, for example would not be unlawful on the part of physicians or public health officers." Id. at 932. They
recommend further that in California, which has passed a statute forbidding disclosure of
results of HIV testing, when physicians encounter asymptomatic patients positive for HIV,
physicians seek the assistance of public health authorities but if this fails, inform the patient's
partners. But see Peterman & Curran, supra note 101, at 2224, where the authors stated that
"steady partners may be the only ones whose risk of infection is high enough to justify the
efforts of active contact tracing."
106. Mills & Crofsy, supra note 105.
107. Gorney, The New Laws of Love/The Courts, Sexually ContractedDiseases and a Partner's Right to Know, Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1985, at Cl, col. 1.
108. Freedman, Wrong Without Remedy, 72 A.B.A. J. 36 (1986).
109. See generally Mills & Crofsy, supra note 105.
110. Id, See also Presentation of David Ostrow at the APA Annual Meeting, entitled "Psychological Reactions to HTLV-III Exposure" (May 13, 1986).
111. Mills & Crofsy, supra note 105, at 934.
112. Id. at 934.
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partners of paingly, even those who recommend that careproviders inform113
tients who have less severe illnesses do so more tentatively.
Whether careproviders begin to routinely inform the partners of patients
suffering from AIDS or HIV-related illness in the future may depend on
whether or not courts allow victims who acquire AIDS to sue physicians for
non-disclosure. Under Tarasoff v. Regents of University of CaliforniaI14 and
its progeny," 5 psychiatrists must take measures to protect third parties
whom they believe their patients intend to harm; this may include warning
potential victims. Whether the courts would consider AIDS patients who
refuse to inform their partners analagous to mental patients who report violent fantasies has yet to be determined." 6 One suit has already been brought
by the former sexual partner of the late Rock Hudson against two physicians
who were treating Hudson for "conspiring" to keep the knowledge of HudThe outcome of this case, and the question of
sons' illness from him.'
113. Okie, supra note 98.
114. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
115. See, e.g., Small, Psychotherapists'Duty to Warn: Ten Years after Tarasoff, 15 GOLDEN
GATE U.L. REV. 271 (1985); Stone, Vermont Adopts Tarasoffa Real Barn-burner, 143 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 352 (1986).

However, the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina has just established a "heightened standard of culpability" for psychotherapists believing that a patient may
be dangerous. In this case, the patient threatened not only a third party, but the therapist
himself. Currie v. United States, 55 U.S.L.W. 2211 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1986)(No. 85-0629).
116. Numerous distinctions have potential legal relevance. For example, in many cases
partners may not be harmed by acquiring HIV because they already have become infected.
But continued exposure may, on the other hand, still increase a partner's risk. See Peterman &
Curran, supra note 101. The conflict in these instances might then be less between respecting
the patient's confidentiality and protecting the identified partner from harm but more between
respecting the patient's confidentiality and providing the partner certain benefits. See supra p.
26. That is, harm to the partner would perhaps be offset, but not avoided.
Furthermore, the risk of harm could be reduced by less drastic measures than warning the
partner. The patient with HIV could be counselled, for example, to use condoms. Even if he
followed this advice, however, the risk to the partner could be substantial. Pregnancy occurs,
for instance, even when condoms are used and the rates of HIV transmission may be comparable. Cf Voeller, Has the Condom Any Proven Value in Preventing the Transmission of Sexually
Transmitted Viral Disease - For Example, Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome?, 291
BRIT. MED. J. 1196 (1985). Finally, when condoms are used during anal sex, they are more
likely to break. Cf Barton, HTL V-III Antibody in Prostitutes, 2 THE LANCET 1424 (1985).
117. Freedman, supra note 108; Gorney, supra note 107. Greenfield reports another case
which has even more far reaching implications. A gynecologist knew that the fiance of one of
his patients was a homosexual because the fiance was the son of another patient who informed
him in confidence of this fact. He also knew that the fiance had lived in San Francisco, and
therefore had a high probability of having HIV infection.
He chose not to tell his patient. Later, after this patient discovered her husband was gay and
probably had HIV and that her gynecologist hadn't told her, she expressed rage at him for not
informing her. Greenfield, A Gynecological Dilemma Involving AIDS, 2 CLINICAL PRAC. SEXUALITY 30 (1985).
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whether or not it harbingers similar suits in the future, has yet to be
determined.
The related legal right of victims to sue sexual partners for keeping information from them has been granted only in the past few years. As recently
as 1980 no such right had been recognized. This is exemplified by the case of
Steven K v. Roni L. , a decision in which the California Court of Appeals
rejected a man's suit against his female sexual partner who had deceived him
into fathering her child by alleging that she was using birth control. Beginning in 1983, however, courts began to recognize that victims had a right to
sue their sexual partners for withholding information. This shift in judicial
policy is clearly demonstrated by the fact that the same court which decided
Steven K. three years earlier held in BarbaraA. v. John G. 1 9 that a woman
who suffered an etopic pregnancy had a right to sue her lover who told her
that he was sterile. This right to "be informed" has been expanded beyond
0
the context of the BarbaraA. case to include infectious diseases. 12
The difficulty in allowing these suits is comparable to permitting patients
to sue partners for failing to disclose that they have HIV. There may be no
means to determine whether such communication actually took place unless
a tape recorder is used. Consequently, a defendant who informed his partner
of a disease may have no means of proving it. Therefore, in many cases the
outcomes of such suits could be highly arbitrary.' 2 '
118.

105 Cal. App. 3d 640, 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1980). In this case, the California Court of

Appeals threw out the' plaintiff's claim that he had suffered financial and mental injury, stating: "[lit is nothing more than asking the court to supervise the promises made between two
consenting adults as to the circumstances of their private sexual conduct. To do so would

encourage unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters affecting the individual's right to
privacy." Id. at 644-45, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 620. See also Gorney, supra note 107; Spake, Trial
and Eros/Sex in the Age of Litigation, 10 MOTHER JONES 25 (1985).
119. 145 Cal. App. 3d 369, 193 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1983). In this case, the plaintiff argued

successfully that women suffer greater risk of injury than men when having sex because they
can get pregnant. For discussion of the plaintiff's situation before and after this case, see
Spake, supra note 118.

120. See Kathleen K. v. Robert B., 150 Cal. App. 3d 992, 198 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984). The
California Court of Appeals for the Second District stated in a footnote that "[i]f a person

knowingly has genital herpes, AIDS, or some other contagious disease, a limited representation that he or she does not have a venereal disease is no defense .... IId. at 996 n.3, 198 Cal.
Rptr. at 276 n.3. See generally Annotation, Tort Liabilityfor Infliction of Venereal Disease, 40
A.L.R. 4th 1089 (1985).
121. Analagous problems arise concerning whether or not rape occurred when no physical
evidence exists, particularly when the sexual partners have previously been lovers or are married. See State v. Gonyaw, 146 Vt. 559, 507 A.2d 944 (1985), and discussion in Purdy, Rape.:
Adding Insult to Injury, 11 VT. L. REV. 364 (1986).
It is not hard to imagine that suits for failing to warn a sexual partner about a contagious
disease could become a second arena in which the pros and cons of the rape shield law are

debated. If a plaintiff who had numerous sexual partners claimed that he had acquired HIV
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Even in the absence of legal precedents regarding liability, caregivers
could use their fear of lawsuits to pressure patients into informing partners.

One civilian careprovider, for instance, told his patient that unless he informed his partner, he (the careprovider) would do so himself, because his
lawyer had advised him that he would be better off being sued by the patient
for violating his confidentiality than by the patient's sexual partner if she
acquired AIDS.' 22 Ethically, this approach would benefit patients' partners
and, in addition, might help some patients overcome their denial of the potential lethality of HIV-related
illness and feel pride in taking some responsi1 23
bility for their illness.
Military careproviders confronting this dilemma might feel more inclined
than their civilian counterparts to contact a patient's partner over a patient's
objection for several reasons. First, it is unlikely that military careproviders
can be sued in their individual capacity and secondly, military physicians
have traditionally assumed preventive medical roles in which their obligations to the unit have superceded conflicting obligations to individual
patients. 124

Military caregivers' responsibilities have also customarily extended to a
serviceperson's family. 125 If, for example, a military physician's patient is
not adequately providing for his family's needs, the doctor might inform the
from a particular partner, that partner, if sued for failing to disclose his infection, would want
to raise that fact as a possible defense. This defense being that some partner other than the
defendant actually infected the plaintiff. A key consideration in this analysis would be the
probative value of the evidence in question weighed against its "private character." See, e.g.,
State v. Patnaude, 140 Vt. 361, 368, 438 A.2d 402, 409 (1981).
Donald Carlson, a San Francisco, California lawyer, in speaking of the possible claims
which could be brought by one sexual partner against another stated: "What about I'll call you
next week?, or I'll love you next week? The other person could say, Well, I relied upon that, I
just don't have one-night stands." Spake, supra note 118, at 29.
122. See generally Ethics Consultationin Health Care, supra note 100; Howe Presentation,
supra note 100. If the victim could prove that had he been warned, he would not have acquired HIV, this legal advice might be sound.
123. Perry & Markowitz, supra note 16, at 1005. In most cases, patients who knew that
they were keeping information that they had HIV from a partner would, at some level, consciously or unconsciously, feel guilty unless they had strong antisocial, sadistic, or psychotic
traits. In many cases, therefore, the physician may be successful in persuading the patient to
inform his partner. The physician can also offer to assist the patient and his partner to deal
constructively with this information, but even if the partner severs the relationship, the patient
may be better off than if he had to live with his guilt.
124. See Ethical Issues, supra note 1; Howe, supra note 1. An inconsistency might seem
apparent between the military physician's overriding his patient's request to keep information
regarding his refusing treatment or regarding a DNR order confidential, but not overriding his
desire to keep his partner informed about his HIV related illness. The morally relevant distinction between these two situations is that in the former instances the patient himself will
benefit and there is overwhelming professional consensus concerning this outcome.
125. See the anecdotal example given supra note 43.
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serviceperson's commander. Institutionally, as well, the service has developed specific policies to take into account the needs of servicepersons' families. However, there is less institutional pressure on military physicians to
intervene to protect civilians (and to do so goes beyond their customary
practice) accordingly, they may be more reluctant to contact partners who
are civilians.
Ethically, informing a patient's partner even when he is a civilian may be
preferable over respecting the patient's confidentiality. 12 6 Nonetheless, there
is no social consensus, widespread practice, or, with the exception of a few
individuals' recommendations, 27 legal or scientific authority supporting a
careprovider's decision to contact an AIDS patient's sexual partners. Military caregivers taking this approach might therefore be acting primarily because they had the power to do so and, for this reason, should probably
128
refrain from contacting an AIDS patient's sexual partner.
Clearly, there are some instances in which military physicians would be
ethically justified in using their authority to inform others of the nature of
the patient's illness - to support the military mission or prevent medical
risk to an entire unit. In other instances, civilian or military careproviders
might be justified in placing their views above those of their community
when the community acts on the basis of ignorance, prejudice, or fear. The
obvious example occurred during World War II when atrocities were per126. See Mills, supra note 105.
127. Id. As a second example, Dean Echenberg, a physician at the San Francisco Department of Health, recommends that heterosexual partners be contacted because they do not
suspect that they are at risk and, therefore, are less likely to take the same precautions as
members of high risk groups. Echenberg, A New Strategy to Prevent the Spread of AIDS
Among Heterosexuals, 254 J. A.M.A. 2129 (1985). See also Two Female "Swingers" Test PositiveforAIDS Virus, Wash. Post, Nov. 14, 1986, at A12, col. 1. (73% of 55 members of swing-

ers groups recently indicated that if they had known they were at risk of acquiring HIV, they
would have changed their sexual behavior).
128. The importance of innovative medical decisions being subjected to public scrutiny and

debate prior to physicians implementing them is illustrated by a recent dilemma which arose
concerning a fetus with anencephaly. The parents suggested that since the fetus would die
soon after birth anyway, its organs might be transplanted to another infant needing them.
John Fletcher, an ethicist, had recently co-written an article in which he had argued in favor
of such a procedure and, in fact, suggested that immediately after birth, as with adults who are
brain dead, the fetus be cooled so that its organs could be best maintained for transplantation

to others. Fletcher, Primates and Anencephalics as Donors for Pediatric Organ Transplants,
in Fetal Therapy (in press). When this case arose and the parents requested this procedure,
Dr. Fletcher was called in as an ethics consultant. He recommended that cooling not be considered despite the fact that this would heighten the likelihood of benefit to transplant recipi-

ents, because this procedure, and cooling especially, had not been widely considered and
discussed by the community. (In a few cases known to Dr. Fletcher, in fact, this same possibility had arisen and was opposed).
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mitted in Germany. 129 When, however, military physicians override a patient's objection and inform the partner that the patient has HIV, there is no
130
evidence that factors such as ignorance, prejudice, or fear are present.
Rather, society appears to be giving priority to protecting a patient's privacy
over other interests.
Military and civilian careproviders may also want to intervene and hospitalize patients with HIV when they believe they are promiscuous. 3 ' Some
believe, for example, that they should commit such patients to psychiatric
wards on the grounds that they are dangerous to others. Obviously, in this
case, physicians overriding such patients' interests in this manner might benefit third parties more profoundly by preventing potential victims from ini129. E.g., Editorial, The Brutalitiesof Nazi Physicians, 132 J. A.M.A. 714 (1946) in which
it is stated that "Perhaps the most serious of all is the failure of German medical organizations
and societies to express in any manner their disapproval."
For a description of the process by which German physicians came to collude in these acts
see Lifton, German Doctors and the Final Solution, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1986, § 6 (Magazine), at 64, col. 1. The instances in which military physicians might have a moral obligation
to oppose military authority would generally, however, be rare. For a discussion of the special
obligation military physicians might have when conducting biological research see Rosebury,
Medical Ethics of Biological Warfare, 6 PERSP. BIOLOGICAL MED. 512 (1963).
Other situations could, however, occur. During World War II, for example, Stelling stated:
If pressure from high ranking field officers can be applied to Army Generals and
Evacuation Hospitals as well as medical officers in general to such an extent [regarding] their prerogative of protecting the health of the fighting men and guaranteeing
that men unfit for combat are kept out of combat, then those hospitals as well as all
medical officers are robbed of sacred duties and rights to which their professional
knowledge and service entitles them.
Hopkins, The Maraudersand the Microbes, in CRISIS FLEETING 379-80 (J.H. Stone ed. 1969).
See generally Hare, R.M., Can I be Blamed for Obeying Orders, in WAR, MORALITY AND THE
MILITARY PROFESSION (1979).
130. Some might assert that the strong degree to which society protects the confidentiality
of patients with HIV has resulted from pressure put forth by the gay community. The inclusion of heterosexual patients in high risk categories and most recently the FDA's extending
advice and protection to prostitutes and heterosexuals engaging prostitutes' services tends to
disprove this allegation. Russell, Prostitutes, Clients on List of Risky Blood Donors, Wash.
Post, Nov. 4, 1986, at Al0, col. 1.
If, on the other hand, the present societal policies were the result of mass ignorance, or fear,
the question then could rise whether military physicians would be justified in doing what was
ethically preferable, because they have the power to do so. On utilitarian grounds, especially,
it would seem that they would. For a discussion of the related ethical question of whether a
person can act ethically in an unethical context see Callahan, The Psychiatristas Double Agent,
4 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 12 (Feb. 1974). Callahan argues in his piece that one can.
131. For case examples of such patients see Flavin, supra note 59, at 1440, 1441; Frances,
ContractingAIDS as a Means of Committing Suicide, 142 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 656 (1985).
In another case of which this author is aware, a serviceperson with HIV who felt angry at
the military wanted to take out his anger by having sex with other servicepersons to transmit
HIV to as many of them as possible.
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tially becoming infected. 132 Professor Richard F. Duncan expressed
concern about the full implications of such an impulse:
Should we exile all the carriers to an island or other remote region
the way lepers were once treated? Should we quarantine them for
life in hospitals or sanitariums? Should we require them to wear
conspicuous scarlet A's and warning bells in order to facilitate
133
their avoidance by non-infected persons?
These measures may not be as implausible as one might imagine. Only a
decado ago, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
Reynolds v. McNichols, 13 4 upheld an ordinance in Denver, Colorado which
allowed authorities to pick up, detain (for up to forty-eight hours), and test
persons suspected of having venereal disease; even though they had never
been convicted of any offense. More recently in Florida, a prostitute with
AIDS was ordered to remain within 200 feet of her home; her compliance
with this order being monitored electronically. 3 5 Likewise, just recently an
"anti-AIDS" proposal was placed on a California ballot, which if it had
passed, would have allowed quarantine of AIDS victims and a ban on their
13 6
employment in restaurants and schools.
132. Some have raised the argument that a small portion of homosexuals, particularly teenagers, have grown up believing that having sex with multiple partners is a safe activity, and
consequently, have never acquired adequate abilities to control their sexual desires or to resist
others' requests for sex. Since, the argument goes on, these individuals are exceptionally vulnerable and are vulnerable through no fault of their own, this provides a compelling rationale
for incarcerating or in some other way preventing promiscuous individuals with HIV from
seducing and infecting these individuals.
This assertion is compatible though far from proven by anecdotal reports that some homosexuals have engaged in anonymous sex on a regular basis. The Center for Disease Control
("CDC") reports, for example, that many AIDS victims have had sexual relations with more
than 1,000 different partners. Morganthau, supra note 61, at 30. One 36 year old man reports
a sexual encounter a day for the past 19 years. Id. at 39. Paul Paroski, M.D., past president of
the National Gay Health Education Foundation, has also reported more generally that homosexual men traditionally use sex to meet a variety of needs and have not yet found "suitable
substitutes" for particular psychological components. Hausmann, supra note 22, at 9.
Even if this conjecture were true, one argument opposing this rationale is that "victims" of
patients with HIV freely choose to have sexual contact and, at least at present, information
concerning the risk of HIV has been widely publicized.
133. Duncan, Public Policy and the AIDS Epidemic, 2 J.CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
169 (1986).
134. 488 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir. 1973). See also Curran, Venereal Disease Detection and
Treatment.- Prostitution and Civil Rights, 65 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 180 (1975).
135. This sanction may have resulted, at least in part, because this person's jailers feared
"catching HIV." "I wanted her off the streets, for the protection of the public, but on the
other hand, I knew the jail employees were concerned." Garrison, Hooker with AIDS Confined, Daily News, Sept. 28, 1985, at 5, col. 1.
136. Schwartz, AIDS Agreement, Wash. Post, July 16, 1986, at A6, col. 2. Ron Rose, a
Hollywood office administrator and AIDS patient states: "It [the referendum being passed] is
definitely going to drive the disease underground ... if people know their names will be re-
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Legally, protective measures of this nature are potentially permissible if
the means of control are rationally related to the end sought, 37 and narrowly tailored to achieve that end.' 3 8 The cases establishing this criteria
4
39
and the bubonic plague; 0
have involved such diseases as typhoid fever'
illnesses transmitted in an entirely different fashion from HIV.14' For this
reason, courts' reasoning regarding HIV might not be analagous. Alternatively, attempts could be made to incarcerate patients with HIV who are
promiscuous on the grounds that they are dangerous to others. Unless it
could be proven that the patient with HIV is mentally ill, this could represent unlawful preventative detention.142 If, on the other hand, patients with
ported, they will not go in for treatment." Yet Colorado has required reporting of AIDS
patients for several months with apparently no signs that victims have gone underground. See
also Mills & Crofsy, supra note 105, at 934. If so, victims may consider the importance of
discovering whether or not they have HIV infection and of obtaining treatment so overriding
that the fear of being reported does not deter them. California's Proposition 64, unlike the
Colorado law, would have restricted patients with HIV infection from certain jobs such as
working in restaurants or schools. Matthews, Call to QuarantineAIDS Virus Trails in California, Wash. Post, Oct. 26, 1986, at A9, col. 2. The referendum failed by better than 2 to 1.
Morganthau, supra note 61, at 32.
A telephone poll conducted by Gallup, Inc. of 756 adults on Nov. 5 and 6, 1986, showed
however that 54% wanted to require people with active cases of AIDS to enter quarantine at a
public health facility where they can be isolated from the public and treated. Growing Concern, GreaterPrecautions, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 1986, at 32-33.
137. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
138. Barmore v. Robertson, 302 Ill. 422, 134 N.E. 815 (1922); Jew Ho v. Williamson, 103
F. 10 (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1900).
139. Barmore, 134 N.E. 815.
140. Jew Ho, 103 F. 10.
141. Since HIV is apparently transmitted almost exclusively by sexual activity, contaminated syringes and transfusions of blood and blood products, other approaches, such as education are likely to be more effective than quarantine.
142. Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280 (2d Cir. 1950). As Mr. Justice Jackson
stated: "Imprisonment to protect society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so
unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of excesses and injustice that I am
loath to resort to it,..."
Id. at 282.
Preventive detention is impermissible in American criminal justice. It is claimed by some,
however, that as a practical matter, it is regularly carried out when excessive bail is set. This
position is exemplified by the following quote:
our hostility towards the notion of preventive detention ... ought not blind us to the
fact that the practice is indulged in by criminal courts every day through the often
unfair and ineffective medium of excessive bail, without the candor that is needed to
make it visible, controllable, and susceptible to appellate [sic] review and constitutional testing.
Note, Preventive Detention Before Trial, 79 HAR. L. REV. 1489, 1493 (1966)(quoting Freed,
Preventing Pre-Trial Release - A Personal Reevaluation 4 (Oct. 14, 1965)(unpublished
work)). But see Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984) (which to a degree permitted preventive
detention of juveniles). See also Mr. Justice Timber's dissent in United States v. MelendezCarrion, 790 F.2d 984 (2d Cir. 1986) in which he stated that: "[T]he constitutional parameters
set forth by the Supreme Court, the legislative history of the Bail Reform Act, and the proce-
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HIV who wished to infect others were considered mentally ill, civil commitment might be possible. One court has, in fact, declared that even when
potential victims are unknown, a physician has an obligation to prevent a
patient whom he believes to be dangerous from harming others. 143 Furthermore, from a psychiatric perspective, the assertion that a patient with HIV
who wants to infect others has an underlying mental illness is credible.' 44
Again, military physicians who wish to protect potential victims by temporarily hospitalizing promiscuous patients with HIV might find it easier to
do so than their civilian colleagues. Military physicians might, for example,
be successful in persuading military psychiatrists to admit such patients. Or
alternatively, any military physician could deny such patients weekend
passes from a military hospital.
Military physicians might also find it easier to take these approaches because they have recommended to their commanders in other contexts that
the freedom of servicepersons be limited for the unit's benefit. For instance,
military physicians have suggested that commanders make areas in which
servicepersons encounter prostitutes off limits, in order to control venereal
disease. A classic example is that of General William Slim who dismissed
three commanding officers during World War II for failing to impose preventative health measures on their troops. 145 (Customarily, commanders
follow physicians' advice because of their obligation to protect their units
health).
Once again, however, there is no specific legal precedent or social consendural safeguards provided by the Act permit pretrial detention where a defendant poses a
serious threat to the safety of the community." Id. at 1011.

Even if possible, commitment of promiscuous patients with HIV infection would most likely
be transient and as a practical consideration, might worsen the problem in the long run by
exacerbating such patient's, "acting out against others by infecting them." E.g., "It is our
belief that punitive and threatening measures against high risk groups are counterproductive,
they drive individuals away from responsible behavior and make education almost impossible." NIH CONSENsus REPORT, supra note 63, at 14. See also supra note 136.
143. Lipari v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185 (D. Neb. 1980). The court emphasized in this case the forseeability of the public being endangered. If the risk of transmission in
spite of condoms is significant, as seems likely, this case might have increased relevance.
Analogous rulings have not, however, been adopted in other jursidictions.
144. The patient may, for example, be denying his illness due to panic. Accordingly, he
might be hospitalized involuntarily as can other patients with violent or homicidal fantasies.
Cf Perry & Markowitz, supra note 16, at I001.
145. W. SUM, DEFEAT INTO VICTORY 180 (1956). General Slim, after taking command of

the Fourteenth Army in 1943, recognized the importance of soldier's taking daily doses of the
malaria suppressant Atabrine, and instituted surprise checks of every unit. If the overall results of blood tests was less than 95% positive for Atabrine, he sacked the commanding officer.

After three commanding officers were sacked, General Slim accomplished his objective. See
Hopkins, supra note 129, at 208.
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sus to allow civilian or military careproviders to incarcerate promiscuous
patients with HIV-related illness over their objection. The NIH panel previously mentioned has, in quite the opposite direction, recommended that
criminal sanctions not be imposed on persons who give blood knowing that
they have an HIV-related illness, despite the fact that these sanctions would
146
be the sole means by which some blood recipients could be protected.
Clinically, a strong case might be made for committing these patients to
psychiatric facilities. However, in the absence of civilian physicians having
authority to take such action, the ethical grounds for military caregivers'
taking such action would be suspect. For reasons essentially similar to those
already given for military physicians' not informing the partners of patients
with HIV, military physicians should refrain from hospitalizing these individuals against their will.
CONCLUSIONS

Military careproviders are in a better position than many of their civilian
conterparts to treat the wide range of psychological and social needs of patients in the communities they serve. They can, for example, take preventive
measures to protect the community. When, however, the military physician
treats servicepersons who have acquired HIV through homosexual contact,
they may have exceptional difficulty meeting this particular group's
psychosocial needs, and these difficulties may be compounded when patients
are reluctant to divulge their homosexual behavior in the military setting.
Such patients may, for example, feel reluctant to issue advance directives,
make a will, or even plan funeral arrangements which involve their sexual
partners.
Until the recent congressional action, servicepersons with HIV who divulged homosexual conduct risked administrative discharge. Under the new
policy, however, military careproviders should inform patients of the current
policy and, possibly, of its implications on a patient's security clearance and
the patient's sexual partner if identified by name. Furthermore, military
physicians should consider telling servicepersons precisely what they would
do with any information the patient's provide them regarding their homosexual conduct before it is divulged and, offering them the opportunity to
discuss their concerns prior to deciding what they will divulge.
Caregivers offering patients the opportunity for such discussion could
make this offer to all patients prior to taking a sexual history or offer it only
to patients they suspect would disclose homosexual conduct. In the latter
instance, a patient could reveal information prior to the caregiver's "warn146. NIH

CONSENSUS REPORT,

supra note 63; Squires, supra note 63.

148

Journalof Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 3:111

ing" him. In this instance, there are substantial, if not compelling, reasons
that a careprovider encountering this situation should keep this information
to himself.
Military caregivers, in general, should consider taking several initiatives,
each of which might help offset, to some degree, the extra burdens some
patients encounter in the military, particularly those due to the patient's reluctance to divulge homosexual behavior. These include discussing with patients who have advanced stages of HIV-related illness who, if anyone, they
would want to make choices for them if they became incompetent and
whether they would wish to make a will or funeral arrangements. If these
plans involve sexual partners, caregivers should help and encourage patients
to pursue these arrangements, but in ways which would not require that the
patient explicitly acknowledge his prior homosexual conduct.
Since these tasks could best be carried out if military careproviders had
unequivocal roles as advocates of HIV patients, military physicians should
not attempt to make decisions themselves when their own patients' best
medical interests conflict. The optimal means of accomplishing this would
be to defer such decisions to "neutral" parties, possibly physicians. Further,
they should attempt to establish more formal mechanisms for delegating
such decisions to persons other than the patient's primary careproviders.
Only then can military physicians remain advocates for their patients and
thus, genuinely merit their trust.
Military careproviders may encounter patients with HIV who will not inform their sexual partners. In such a situation, it is suggested that the physician should not inform a patient's sexual partner over the patient's objection.
Similarly, military careproviders may encounter situations in which they believe that a patient will engage in promiscuous sex, and thus, want to hold
him in the hospital for at least a short time, against his will. Again, unless
there is a compelling military reason for doing otherwise, the careprovider
should probably refrain from informing the partners of patients with HIVrelated illness. In both instances, caregivers should still do all they can to
attempt to influence these patients to take responsibility for their illness,
such as informing their partners about their illness and urging them to take
147
precautions when having sexual relations.
Other important ethical issues involving patients with HIV have already
and will continue to emerge. Among these are the conditions under which
147. One physician, known to this author, advises patients who insist on having sex without using condoms that they find partners who have also tested positive for HIV. This advice
may be ethically questionable because it may put some who already have HIV at greater risk,
but it might be effective in helping some patients with HIV limit their social contact with
persons not infected.
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military patients with HIV should serve as research subjects to provide, for
example, epidemiological data. Servicepersons with HIV have already
benefitted society by providing such data and, presumably, should continue
to do so. The military screening program is the largest effort currently directed at identifying HIV-related illness in persons other than high-risk
groups and it has already provided vital information regarding the virus'
spread in the general community and the means of its transmission.1 48 Consequently, society may, in at least a theoretical sense, owe these patients
some compensatory benefit. This provides yet an additional reason that the
military, on society's behalf,' 4 9 might attempt to meet these patients' needs
as optimally as possible.

148. See generally Engel, supra note 60; Russell, supra note 60; Norman, supra note 10.
149. "The Body of Law and regulations which defines the purpose and methods of organized military power ultimately is one with and indivisible from the moral and legal constitution
of the society which supports it." G. BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE 23 (1980).

